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1. INTRODUCTION
In response to the worst economic meltdown since the Great
Depression, in 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank or the Act). The purpose of the
Act is to "promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to
fail', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes."' Dodd-Frank sections 1502, 1503 and 1504 focus on some of
these "other purposes." These specialized disclosure provisions, relating to
conflict minerals, mine safety and resource extraction, respectively, are
particularly controversial for their social and humanitarian, rather than
financial, basis. Conflict minerals (section 1502) and resource extraction
(section 1504) disclosures have proven especially controversial. Hidden
within the 2300-page Act, these two sections are "aimed not at preventing
another financial meltdown but, rather, at fostering transparency about
commercial activities in foreign countries., 2
This Note will focus on the effects of the conflict minerals and
resource extraction provisions on businesses, particularly the effects on
small businesses. Part II begins with a short introduction to the Dodd-Frank
Act and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC or Commission)
role in relation to the Act overall as well as the specific disclosure
provisions. It then gives background on each provision, detailing the
purpose and requirements of the provisions, as well as the recent legal
challenges to each. Part III explores the wide-reaching scope of the
provisions and the costs and benefits of the provisions-financial, social
and otherwise. In Part IV, this Note discusses how, while the benefits of the
provisions may (or may not) fit the humanitarian goals, the benefits are
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intangible and outweighed by the severe monetary costs and competitive
disadvantage to affected businesses. Moreover, the far-reaching scope,
which provides no exclusions for small businesses, harms small businesses
to a degree that makes these provisions irresponsible, particularly
considering the financial nature and purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act. This
Note then proposes several solutions. Firstly, Congress should re-examine
these provisions in light of the reasonable concerns expressed by many
businesses and the SEC, and due to the discrepancy between the
humanitarian motivations behind these provisions and the goals of Dodd-
Frank. Alternately, this note proposes that the SEC use its rulemaking
powers to re-interpret the language of these provisions in a way that
accurately encompasses the commentators' worries. Finally, this Note
encourages businesses to continue to pursue thoughtful challenges to the
provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of Dodd-Frank and the SEC
The financial meltdown was attributable to a number of factors,
though these factors differ based on whom you ask. Some narratives point
to government intervention in the housing market as the primary cause.'
Others point to greedy Wall Street bankers, who manipulated the financial
system and the politicians in Washington in order to enjoy large personal
gains at the expense of homeowners.4 The latter is the primary view of the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the commission created by Congress
to investigate the causes of the financial crisis.5 Of course, the causes are
more complicated than either of these narratives seems to suggest.
During its investigation, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
found that the particular mix of circumstances that led to the meltdown
began in the early 2000s, when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and
mortgage rates fell, resulting in a surge of home refinancing.6 Home sales
increased and housing values skyrocketed, leading many people to buy and
sell homes under the belief that housing prices would always remain high.7
Homeowners took out home equity loans to pay for children's college,
medical and credit card bills, as well as to update their homes, go on
3 Bill Thomas et al., What Caused the Financial Crisis?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27,
2011, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014240527487046980045761045005249
98280.
4id.
5id.
6 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 5 (2011).7 Id.
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vacation and start new businesses.8 In an attempt to participate in the
booming economy, many borrowers agreed to take part in risky
nontraditional loan schemes in order to be able to live beyond their means. 9
These nontraditional loans were offered by Wall Street, which
labored to provide loans to meet the growing demand.' 0 Financiers gave out
loans to "subprime" borrowers with poor credit histories who lacked the
ability to repay them." These "subprime" loans were then pooled together
to create allegedly low risk securities, which made them at least appear
"safer.' 12 These pooled mortgages were then used to back securities called
"collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which were sliced into tranches by
degree of exposure to default."' 3 The securities were then incorrectly
categorized as safe investments by credit reporting agencies-a decision
that went unquestioned.14
This situation culminated in the housing bubble, which inevitably
burst, exposing the facade that was the U.S. financial system.' 5 By this
time, most large U.S. investment banks were deeply in debt and heavily
dependent on short-term loans to conduct their day-to-day business. 16 As
the borrowers of "subprime" mortgages failed to pay in greater and greater
numbers, Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers' creditors became fearful, due
to their heavy involvement in these subprime mortgages, and refused to
renew their short-term loans.' 7 Large institutional customers of Bear
Steams and Lehman Brothers then "panicked and yanked their money out
of.. .both firms, triggering a 21st century version of a run.' ' 8 The two
investment banks' liquid assets disappeared within days and they were
unable to pay back their short-term loans, which then jeopardized other big
firms, among them Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.' 9 Lehman
Brothers was forced into bankruptcy, which threw the global financial
market into chaos.20 This situation began the worst financial crisis since the
21Great Depression.
8 Id.
9Id. at7.
'
0 Id. at6.
"1 The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-
are-still-being-felt-five-years-article.
'
2 1d
131id
14 Thomas et al., supra note 3.
15 The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, supra note 11.
16 BANKING LAW MANUAL § 4.07 (2014).
17 Id.
181d.
191d.
20 id.
21 See DAVID S KEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 2 (2010).
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Congress enacted Dodd-Frank to address this situation. Dodd-Frank
creates a multitude of new laws as well as a new federal agency, the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection, and concentrates these reforms mainly
on large banks and nonbank financial institutions, which present the
greatest possibility of "systemic economic risk., 22 The new regulations can
be divided into two categories of objectives: those that "limit the risk of
contemporary finance" and those that "limit the damage caused by the
failure of a large financial institution.,
23
Pursuant to its goals of transparency and protection of consumers
and investors, Dodd-Frank appoints the SEC as the regulatory agency to
implement ninety provisions in the Act, including the disclosure provisions
set forth in sections 1502 and 1504.24 This is in conjunction with the SEC's
role of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitating capital formation.25 The SEC accomplishes these goals
mainly through public disclosure requirements, which are intended as a
means to protect investors. 26 Thus, "the SEC typically only requires the
disclosure of financial information that would assist an investor in the
valuation of a security.',
27
Mary Jo White, Chair of the SEC, has said that while the agency must
respect Congress and write the rules it is required to write, she questions
whether federal securities law is the proper vehicle to pursue social changes
or end human rights abuses, the topics addressed in sections 1502 and
1504.28 According to White, these socially motivated rules "seem more
directed at exerting societal pressure on companies' rather than helping
investors make informed decision., 29 Likewise, former SEC Commissioner
Troy Parades expressed that the 1502 rulemaking proved to be especially
difficult due to the fact the Commission "has no expertise when it comes to
22 Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and Too-big-to-fail, 6
BROOKLYN J. CoRp. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 292-93 (2012).
23 SKEEL, supra note 21, at 4.
24 Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
SEC (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml.25 The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC,
h ttp://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013).26 Emily Veale, Note, Is There Blood on Your Hands-free Device?: Examining
Legislative Approaches to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 503, 527 (2013).
27 Id. at 528 (citing Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1197,1208 (1999)).
28 Aruna Viswanatha & Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Chair Chastises Congress over New
Disclosure Rules, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2013, 9:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/us-sec-disclosures-
idUSBRE99215Q20131003.29 Sarah N. Lynch, SEC's Gallagher Slams Effort to Adopt Political Disclosure
Rules, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
10/25/sec-gallagher-disclosure-idUSL1NOIFOSN20131025.
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the humanitarian goal of ending the atrocities that besiege the DRC
[Democratic Republic of Congo]," nor the expertise to regulate supply
chain management.3° With regard to 1504, SEC Commissioner Daniel M.
Gallagher expressed his concern that "[t]his rule will be a very indirect
route to achieving any sort of global governmental accountability.' Of the
SEC involvement, he added, "I do not think the SEC has any realistic
prospect of achieving the desired result, although I am fully convinced that
we will impose significant costs on issuers - and thereby shareholders
in the process. 32 Nevertheless, the Commission promulgated rules for both
provisions as mandated by Congress.
B. An Overview: Section 1502 Conflict Mineral Disclosures
1. Purpose and Background of Section 1502
Section 1502 arose out of several earlier bills that died in
committee, including the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008, the
Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 and most recently the Conflict
Minerals Trade Act (H.R. 4128)."3 The purpose of H.R. 4128 was to "help
stop the deadly conflict over minerals in eastern Congo by regulating the
importation and trade of tin, tungsten and tantalum - minerals commonly
used in cell phones, laptop computers and other popular electronic
devices. 34 However, the resolution never moved out of committee.35 Then,
in July 2010, provisions focusing on DRC conflict minerals were attached
on the final night of deliberations by a House-Senate conference committee
to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.36 This
became section 1502, which passed into law with the rest of the Act.37
Congress enacted section 1502 operating under the belief that "the
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by
extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to
30 Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open Meeting to
Adopt a Final Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 22, 2012).31 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at SEC Open
Meeting: Proposed Rules to Implement Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act
"Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers") (Aug. 22, 2012).
2Id.
33 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1325 (2012).
34 Seay, supra note 2, at 10.
35 Id.
36 Seay, supra note 2; Letter from Gary G. Miller et al. to Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 10, 2012).
37 Seay, supra note 2.
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an emergency humanitarian situation therein., 38 Congress was compelled to
act based on the horrific violence perpetrated by Rwandan extremists in the
DRC, violence funded through the illicit sale of minerals.39 According to
the bill's sponsor, many researchers have found that "when the price of
black market natural resources in the DRC goes down, the rate of violence
drops with it."4 Congress thought that by "requiring companies 'to make
public and disclose annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission if
the minerals in their products originated or may have originated in Congo'
will help 'to ensure activities involving such minerals did not finance or
benefit armed groups."' 4 ' Congress believed that the disclosure would help
ensure that the minerals would not finance or benefit an armed group by
encouraging the companies that used such minerals to find new, responsible
sources.
4 2
Whether this purpose can be accomplished with this legislation is
open to debate. The Information Technology Industry Council, a fervent
advocate for improved transparency and accountability in relation to
Congolese minerals, believes that "the solution to Congo's problems will
not come from the private sector[,]" but rather through the "steadfast and
coordinated engagement of global governments.A 3 By contrast, many other
humanitarian organizations expressed in their letters to the SEC support of
the measures, believing that there is a fit between due diligence in the
supply chain and humanitarian aid, or at least that the situation in the DRC
is dire enough that the United States should do something to help.
44
2. Requirements of Section 1502
The Act directs the SEC to promulgate regulations requiring
companies that use "conflict minerals" that are "necessary to the
38 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).39 Letter from Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senator, & Jim McDermott, U.S.
Congressman, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 4,
2010).40 Id.
4l Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 156
CONG. REC. S3976 (May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold)). The D.C. Circuit
Court recently overturned the 1st Amendment claim in Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 2014 WL 1408274 (D.C.C. Apr. 14, 2014).
42 Nat'lAss'n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 156 CONG.
REC. S3817 (May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin)).
43 Seay, supra note 2, at 12.
44 See Letter from Corinna Gilfillan, Head of Global Witness U.S. Off. to Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 12, 2010); see also Letter from
Wynnette LaBrosse, President of Open Square Foundation to Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 30, 2010); Letter from Laura Matter, A
Thousand Sisters & Outcry for Congo to Meredith Cross, Director, Div. of Corp.
Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Dec. 15, 2010).
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functionality or production" of their products to disclose to the Commission
whether those minerals originated in the DRC or an adjacent country.45
"Conflict minerals" is defined by the Act as "columbite-tantalite (coltan),
cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives," along with any other
mineral or derivative that the Secretary of State determines is "financing
conflict" in the DRC.4 6 These conflict minerals can be found in many types
of products such as electric circuits (cassiterite); electrical components in
cell phones, computers, aircrafts, surgical equipment, etc. (columbite-
tantalite); jewelry, electronic, aerospace equipment (gold); metal wires and
electrodes involved in electrical, heating and welding applications
(wolframite).47
If a company does have these conflict minerals in its supply chain,
then it must submit an additional report to the SEC that contains: 1) a
description of the measures taken "to exercise due diligence on the source
and chain of custody of such minerals" and 2) "a description of the products
manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC free" as
well as "facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country of
origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or
location of origin with the greatest possible specificity." 48 Moreover, the
company must make "available to the public on the Internet website of such
person the information disclosed."49
The final SEC rule, the final form of the regulations the SEC made
as required by the Act, gives three steps for determining coverage of the
provision: 1) an issuer needs to determine whether its manufactured
products contain conflict minerals that subject it to the requirements of
Dodd-Frank section 1502; 2) an issuer needs to determine whether its
necessary conflict minerals originated in the covered countries; 3) an issuer
with necessary conflict minerals from covered countries that are not from
recycled or scrap sources needs to conduct due diligence and potentially
provide a Conflict Minerals Report.50 Covered countries include the DRC
and adjoining countries.51
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)(1)(A), 78m(p)(2)(B) (2012). The D.C. Circuit Court
recently declared parts of 15 U.S.C. § 78m unconstitutional in Nat'lAss 'n of Mfrs.
2014 WL 1408274.
46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11l -
203, § 1502(e)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).
47 ERNST & YOUNG, CONFLICT MINERALS: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
NEW DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND How ERNST & YOUNG
CAN HELP 2 (2012).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(l)(A)(i)-(ii).
491 d. § 78m(p)(1)(E).
50 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 47.
51 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,275 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). The D.C. Circuit Court recently overturned the
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The final rule requires an issuer that determines that its conflict
minerals did not originate in the covered countries, or that they did come
from recycled or scrap sources, to disclose that determination in its
specialized disclosure report.52 In its specialized disclosure report the issuer
must then briefly describe the reasonable country of origin inquiry it used in
reaching the determination and the results of the inquiry.53 Additionally, the
issuer must disclose this information on its publicly available website under
a separate heading in its specialized disclosure report entitled "Conflict
Minerals Disclosure" and provide a link to that website.54
If the issuer determines that its conflict minerals did originate in the
covered countries, and that they are not from recycled or scrap sources, it is
required to file a Conflict Minerals Report as an exhibit to its specialized
disclosure report and to provide the report on its publicly available internet
website.55 The issuer must also disclose "[u]nder a separate heading in its
specialized disclosure report entitled 'Conflict Minerals Disclosure' . . . that
it has filed a Conflict Minerals Report and provide the link to its Internet
Web site where the Conflict Minerals Report is publicly available."
'5 6
Furthermore, the final form of the rule "requires an issuer to
provide the conflict minerals disclosures that would have been in the body
of the annual report in the body of a new specialized disclosure report on a
new form, Form SD.",57 Thus, issuers required to provide a Conflict
Minerals Report must do so as an exhibit.
58
The final version of the rule applies to "any issuer that files reports
with the Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange
Act, including domestic companies, foreign private issuers, and smaller
reporting companies."59 The final rule allows for a transition period of two
years for all issuers and four years for smaller reporting companies. 6° A
smaller reporting company is defined as "a company with less than $75
million of public equity float or revenues less than $50 million, if float
cannot be calculated.",6' During this period, issuers may describe their
products as "DRC conflict undeterminable" if they are not able to meet the
constitutionality of requiring conflict minerals disclosure in Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, 2014 WL 1408274 (D.C.C. Apr. 14, 2014).
52 7 Fed. Reg. at 56,277.
53 id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 56,363.57 Id. at 56,280.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 56,287.60 Id. at 56,281.
61 Conflict Minerals: Frequently Asked Questions, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
LLP, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/audit-assurance-services/conflict-minerals-
faqs.jhtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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"DRC conflict free definition," meaning that after due diligence, they are
unable to determine if their conflict minerals financed or benefited armed
groups in the covered countries or whether the conflict minerals came from
recycled or scrap sources.62 Additionally, the rule exempts any conflict
minerals that are outside the supply chain prior to January 31, 2013 .63
Minerals are considered outside the supply chain when they have been
smelted or fully refined into their final state of metal or did not originate in
the covered countries. 64
3. National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC
The SEC's rulemaking was challenged in federal court by the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the Chamber of Commerce
and the Business Roundtable.65 Plaintiffs challenged the rule as arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and claimed
that the rule improperly compels speech in violation of the First
Amendment.66 The District Court ruled on summary judgment motions
based on these claims, finding in favor of the SEC.67
Plaintiffs alleged that "the SEC improperly deferred to Congress's
determination that conflict minerals disclosures would decrease violence in
the DRC," and that it neglected to conduct its own "independent analysis of
the social benefits of the rule, and arbitrarily underestimated aspects of the
Rule's costs. 68 Because of this, "Plaintiffs contended that the SEC violated
Exchange Act Sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) by failing to consider whether the
Rule would 'promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation' and
would not 'impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of' the Exchange Act., 69 The district court,
however, did not believe that it was clear that the requirements in Exchange
Act sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) applied in the first place, "since they were not
expressly referenced in Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank, and Congress had
already concluded the disclosure requirements were necessary and in the
public interest., 70 Furthermore, the court states that those Exchange Act
sections do not mandate the type of detailed analysis that the Plaintiffs
advocate, but rather direct the SEC to consider the impact on various
62 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,310.
63 Id.
64 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 47, at 1.65 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2013).
66 Id.
67 DC District Court Upholds SEC's Conflict Mineral Due Diligence and
Reporting Rule, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Aug. 9, 2013) [hereinafter STEPTOE],
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-8990.html.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 id.
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economic factors.71
With respect to the Plaintiffs' claim that the SEC improperly
deferred to Congress on the issue of cost, the court determined that the SEC
weighed comments from many parties and carefully selected the figures
that it, in its discretion, felt were most appropriate.72 The court stated that
while Plaintiffs "may disagree, the Court cannot say that the SEC acted
arbitrarily or capriciously" in reaching its determinations with regard to
cost.73 The court also denied the Plaintiffs' APA claims, finding that "the
Commission's choice not to include a de minimis exception in the Final
Rule was the product of reasoned decision-making. 74 The court believed
that the SEC's decision was not compelled by Congress, as Plaintiffs
claimed, but rather that the record demonstrated that the SEC exercised its
discretion in interpreting its mandate.75 Thus, because the statute was silent,
the court believed that the Commission was entitled to deference in its
determination that a de minimis exception would jeopardize the
effectiveness of the rule.76
Additionally, the court denied the First Amendment claim finding a
reasonable fit between the relevant provisions of section 1502, the Final
Rule and Congress's objectives in promoting peace and security in and
around the DRC, thus satisfying the scrutiny standard for the case.77 The
court focused on the constitutionality of requiring companies to post
conflict minerals disclosures on their own public websites.78 Because
Plaintiffs conceded that the "government has a substantial if not compelling
interest in the promotion of peace and security in the covered countries,"
the court focused on whether the SEC was required to prove a stronger
relationship between the rule and Congress's interest in promoting peace
and security in the DRC, but found a direct and material connection. 79 The
court noted that the Supreme Court has found speech restrictions to be
justified through connections based on anecdote, history and common sense
rather than strictly empirical data.80 Furthermore, the court observed that
"covered companies have ample opportunity under the Rule to add
qualifying comments and explanation to any public disclosure they may be
required to make.,
81
Thus, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
71 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (internal citations omitted).
72 Id. at 61.
73 id.74 Id. at 66.751Id. at 68.
76 STEPTOE, supra note 67.
17 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
78 STEPTOE, supra note 67.
79 Id.
80 Nat'lAss'n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79.
81 STEPTOE, supra note 67.
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denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the SEC's
motion for summary judgment.82 In an appeal of this decision,s3 a divided
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the
SEC's rule did violate the First Amendment, but that the SEC did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously, and that the cost benefit analysis was adequate.
84
Thus, the rule is no longer good law, just six weeks before the May 31,
2014 reporting deadline for first disclosures, leaving companies in "limbo"
for compliance.
85
C. An Overview: Section 1504 Oil Payment Disclosures
1. Purpose and Background of Section 1504
The basic purpose of section 1504 "is to bring greater transparency
to extractive-related payments made to governments by resource extraction
issuers [that are] required to report to the SEC. 86 With this provision,
Congress intended to address the "resource curse" phenomenon in which
oil, gas reserves and minerals lead to "corruption, wasteful spending,
military adventurism, and instability" in a country when "oil money
intended for a nation's poor ends up lining the pockets of the rich or is
squandered on showcase projects instead of productive investments. 87
Initially, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was
developed to address this same concern. 88 Under the EITI, participating
companies and their host governments "submit payment information
confidentially to an independent reconciler who compiles the information
and publishes a publicly accessible report." 89 Much of the success of the
EITI was due to the combination of business and government support on a
global scale.90 However, Congress was unsatisfied with the voluntary
82 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 956 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
83 Nat'lAss'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 2014 WL 1408274 (D.C.C. Apr. 14, 2014).
84 Yin Wilczek, D.C. Circuit Rules Conflict Minerals Law, SEC Regulation Violate
First Amendment BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 15, 2014), available at
http://bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJpZCI6IkEwRT1BOVk VDM/anM9MCZzdWJzY
3JpcHRpb25OeXB1PWJuYXNsZCZpc3N 1ZTOyMDEOMDQxNSZjYW lwYWlnbj
1 ibmFlbWFpbGxpbmsmc210ZW5hbWU9Ym5hliwiY3R4dCI6IkJCTkEiLCJ 1 dWl
kIjoibjkrSTVSVTFCNHITVU4rWnM 1 Umt5QT09aVFKdFIvRUIJVVVtMStNcjg
OWnRKdzO9IiwidGltZSI6IjEzOTc 1MjAwMjcwMzMiLCJzaWciOiIyT21 hcXYyS
0gzWnVSTExXcFBDTFRyRIE3Nk09IiwidiI61jEifQ==Id
86 Letter from Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator, to Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Dec. 1, 2010).
87 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 156
CONG. REC. S3816 (May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Lugar)).
88 Id. at 9.
89 Id.9 0 GRANT D. ALDONAS, ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1504 OF THE WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, SPLIT ROCK INT'L, INC. 5 (2011).
100 THE OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 9.1
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
international initiative and sought instead to apply this standard to all
resource extraction issuers.91
2. Requirements of Section 1504
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, titled "Disclosure of
Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers," requires the Commission to
"issue final rules that require each resource extraction issuer to include in
an annual report of the resource extraction issuer information relating to
any payment made by the resource extraction issuer," its subsidiaries or
other entities under its control to "a foreign government or the Federal
Government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural
gas, or minerals. 92 A resource extraction issuer is defined as a company
that "(i) is required to file an annual report with the Commission; and (ii)
engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals., 93
The report should include "(i) the type and total amount of such payments
made for each project of the resource extraction issuer relating to the
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; and (ii) the type..
. made to each government., 94 Additionally, "[t]o the extent practicable,"
the SEC should publish online a "compilation of the information required to
be submitted." 95
Based on this language, the SEC promulgated a final rule; "except
for where the language or approach of Section 13(q) clearly deviates from
the EITI, the final rules are consistent with the EITI. ' ' 96 The final rule
requires that issuers provide annual reports with disclosures made through a
new form, Form SD, rather than the existing Exchange Act annual report.97
Additionally, the Commission requires public filing of the annual reports
and Form SD through its online EDGAR system.98 With this interactive
electronic data, the rule requires the use of electronic tags that identify:
* The total amounts of the payments by category;
* The currency used to make the payments;
* The financial period in which the payments were
made;
The business segment of the resource extraction
issuer that made the payments;
91 Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
92 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012).
9 Id. § 78m(q)(1)(D).9 4 Id. § 78m(q)(2)(A).
95 Id. § 78m(q)(3)(A).
96 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365,
56,367 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
97 d. at 56,368.98 id.
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* The government that received the payments and
the country in which the government is located;
and
The project of the resource extraction issuer to
which the payments relate. 99
The final rules mandate that this information be disclosed publicly. 00 In
this instance, it does deviate from the EITI, which does not require public
disclosure of payments by individual companies or for individualprojects.' °1 The final rules provide no exemptions, not even for small
businesses, despite small business exemptions located in other provisions of
Dodd-Frank.'0 2
3. American Petroleum Institute v. SEC
In response to this rulemaking, the American Petroleum Institute,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Independent Petroleum Association of
America and the National Foreign Trade Council filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 0 3 The court
allowed Oxfam America, Inc. to intervene as a defendant.' °4 "Plaintiffs
argued that section 13(q) and the Rule compel speech in violation of the
First Amendment" and present several APA challenges.'0 5 The court
declined to reach the First Amendment issues because there were two
substantial errors: "the Commission misread the statute to mandate public
disclosure of the reports" and the Commission's "decision to deny any
exemption was, given the limited explanation provided, arbitrary and
capricious."'
0 6
The court held that Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act did not
require that disclosure of the annual resource extraction payments reports
be made publically.'l 7
The court made clear that "while the statute referred to a public
compilation of the resource extraction payments information required to be
submitted, this directive was limited 'to the extent practicable' and did not
address whether or not the resource extraction payments reports must be
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 ALDONAS, supra note 90, at 6.
102 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg., 56,365,
56,372 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
103 See generally Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. Jul. 2,
2013).
104Id. at 11.
105 Id.
106 Id. (emphasis in original).
10 7 LAURA D. RiCHMAN ET AL., MAYER BROWN, US DISTRICT COURT VACATES THE
SEC's RESOURCE EXTRACTION PAYMENTS DISCLOSURE RULE 1 (July 8, 2013).
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made public."' 0 8 Furthermore, the court stated that the compilation aspect
was deliberate to allow "the SEC to selectively omit public disclosures of
commercially sensitive information."' 0 9 Because the SEC relied on the
"unjustified assumption that it was Congress's judgment" that full public
disclosure was required, rather than conducting its own analysis, the court
held that the SEC's rule was invalid.!"0
In determining that the Commission erred, the court focused on the
lack of disclosure exemptions for "resource extraction payments made in
countries such as Angola, Cameroon, China and Qatar, where such
disclosure is prohibited.""' "[T]he SEC argued that adopting an exemption
would have been 'inconsistent' with the 'structure and language of Section
13(q).""' 2 The court, however, found that "the SEC 'impermissibly rested
on the blanket proposition that avoiding all exemptions best furthers section
13(q)'s purpose.'113
The court found that the SEC misread the phrases "a compilation of
the information" and "[t]o the extent practicable" and explained that a
natural reading would suggest an exemption for commercially sensitive
information. 14 "According to the court, the SEC focused on a broad and
incorrect reading of the statute's purpose rather than undertaking specific
analysis and in so doing 'abdicated its statutory responsibility to
investors." '""
Thus, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the motion to vacate the rule and remanded to the SEC for further
proceedings. 1 6 The SEC declined to appeal." 7 In response to the court's
decision, SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher said rewriting the rule
"should be very low on our to-do list" because the SEC has little expertise
where foreign policy and energy policy are concerned. 118
108 id.
109 Id.
110Id.
1"'Id. at2.112 id.
1131id
114 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14-15 (D.D.C. Jul. 2, 2013).
115 RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 2.
"
6 Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
117 Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Declines to Appeal Extractive Disclosure Ruling,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2013/09/03/sec-declines-to-appeal-extractive-disclosure-
ruling/html.
118 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at
AICPA/SIFMA Financial Management Society Conference on the Securities
Industry (Oct. 25, 2013).
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III. EFFECTS: THE COST OF BEING COVERED
A. The Effects of Section 1502
1. Costs and Benefits of Compliance
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
overturned the SEC's final rule because it compelled speech in violation of
the First Amendment, as detailed above that is only a small part of the rule,
and the rest is likely to remain intact. The SEC's rulemaking process
exposed the certain costs and uncertain benefits of the section 1502 conflict
minerals provision. The SEC notes that the objectives of Section 1502 do
not appear to be those that will "necessarily generate measurable, direct
economic benefits to investors or issuers."" 9 However, some commentators
emphasize that "sustainable and responsible investors" may be interested in
assessing the risk that a company's supply chain contains these minerals.
20
The commentators explained during rulemaking that "warring
parties [in the DRC] finance themselves via control of mines," and in so
doing, these parties "subject[] the civilian population to [atrocities such as]
massacres, rape, extortion, forced labour and recruitment of child
soldiers."'' These conflict minerals then join the global supply chain. 22
Due diligence is thought by some policy makers to be the most effective
means of tackling the conflict minerals trade because it is a concept that
manufacturers understand and can implement, according to these policy
makers, immediately and at low cost.
123
This cost however, some commentators argue, is not warranted
because the proposed rule did not adequately demonstrate any benefits to
investors. 124 These commentators "focused on three categories of costs as
the most significant: [d]ue diligence for both suppliers and issuers,
information technology ('IT') costs, and audit costs.' ' 125 The SEC
recognizes that the final rule will impose significant compliance costs on
companies who use or supply conflict minerals and notes that most of the
commentators believed that compliance costs would be high. 126 However,
the cost in merely determining whether conflict minerals are used in a
supply chain may be high in themselves; for instance, gold with high levels
"19 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,335 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
120 Id. at 53,336.
121 Letter from Corinna Gilfillan, Head of U.S. Off. Global Witness to Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 12, 2010) (on file with the SEC).122 id.
123 id.
124 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,335.
125 Id. at 56,336.
126 Id. at 56,279.
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of purity, bought through many sources, would have no identifying features
with which to readily trace the origin.127 Moreover, most manufacturers
have tens if not hundreds of suppliers, all of which would need to be
traced. 128 In a "complex, multi-layered network of trading companies and
suppliers," most of these companies only have contact with the first tier
supplier.
129
Additionally, "cost per unit of manufactured product for those
items for which one or more conflict minerals are necessary may vary
widely from pennies a part ... to possibly many thousands of dollars per
finished manufactured product."'' 30 The high cost per product ratio could be
especially burdensome for small and startup companies, who produce far
fewer products than their larger counterparts. 3 'A study commissioned by
Senator Durbin, a proponent of the bill, found that the bulk of the cost of
compliance would fall on "suppliers to public companies, including small
and medium-sized businesses."132 These small businesses face higher
compliance costs in order to determine and verify sources of minerals-
costs relating to hiring additional staff, auditing companies, lawyers,
accountants and buying software for data management. 33 Because of these
costs, small businesses may be unable to comply due to lack of resources to
trace minerals to the point of extraction, putting both themselves and their
SEC regulated clients in a precarious situation.
34
Overall, the monetary range for costs of compliance with section
1502 provided by commentators was anywhere between $387,650,000 and
$16 billion. 35 Using a combination of these analyses, the Commission
concluded the estimated initial cost of compliance to be between
127 Letter from Patrick Dorsey, Senior Vice President, Sec'y and General Counsel,
Tiffany & Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 29,
2010) (on file with the SEC).
128 Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (on file with the SEC).129 Id.
130 Letter from Robert W. Row to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Oct. 29, 2010) (on file with the SEC) (stating that "an Intel spokesperson
is reported in the Columbus Dispatch 25 July 2010 to have estimated").
131 id.
132 Memorandum from Fin. Serv. Comm. Majority Comm. Staff to Members of the
Comm. on Fin. Servs. 3 (May 16, 2013) (on file with the U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
133 The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America
and the Congo: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Pol'y & Trade of
the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112 Cong. 2, 25 (2012) (statement of Steve Pudles, CEO
of Spectral Response).
134 Letter from Olympia Snowe, U.S. Senator, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Snowe] (on file with the
SEC).
135 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,336 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
2014 Dodd-Frank's Specialized Disclosure Provisions 1502 and 1504: 105
Small Business, Big Impact
approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, with the annual cost of ongoing
compliance between $207 million and $609 million. 136 The National
Association of Manufacturers, however, estimates that the compliance costs
will be between $8 billion and $16 billion.1 37 Whatever the exact number,
the monetary costs are high and hard to weigh against the non-quantifiable
benefits of section 1502.
2. Scope of Section 1502
Section 1502 has a wide reaching scope that could affect far more
businesses than was likely intended. This section applies to persons who are
required to file reports with the Commission and who have products in
which "conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of
a product manufactured by such person. '38 Conflict minerals are
considered necessary based on a broad definition not limited to the
product's basic function or economic utility. 39 If there are multiple
functions or uses for the conflict minerals, they "need only be necessary for
one function to be 'necessary to the functionality' of that product.' 40 Even
if the use of conflict minerals is "purely ornamental, that may not be
sufficient to exclude product from the rule if the product itself is primarily
ornamental.' 141 The National Association of Manufacturers believes nearly
every manufacturing sector will be affected by the legislation and
regulations, from electronics to "automotives, medical devices, consumer
products, defense, capital goods, [and] aerospace.' 42
The SEC's rule for conflict minerals "applies to all issuers that file
reports with the Commission under Exchange Act Sections 13(a) or 15(d),
whether or not the issuer is required to file such reports," including
voluntary filers. 143 This includes "domestic companies, foreign private
issuers, and smaller reporting companies. ' '144 But while "the provision only
applies to the SEC-listed companies, the truth is it will affect non-SEC
companies and small businesses all over this country," that are members of
116 Id. at 56,334.
137 Id. at 56,336.
138 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)(2)(A)-(B) (2012).
139 SQUIRE SANDERS LLP, SUMMARY OF CONFLICT MINERALS RULE 5 (2012).
140 Id141 Id.
142 See Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n (on file with the SEC).
143 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Frequently Asked Questions: Conflict
Materials, SEC (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfm/guidance/conflictminerals-faq.htm.
144 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,285 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
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the supply chain for these SEC regulated companies. 45 Because these SEC
regulated companies are required to trace the origin of conflict minerals
through their supply chain, any business within that chain, including small,
private businesses, will need to participate in the potentially costly due
diligence process.
Members of the Senate and House Small Business Committees
were concerned that the SEC's initial analysis of the costs of the proposed
rule did not accurately consider the proposed rule's impact on small
businesses. 146 These members were concerned that the SEC did not
consider all compliance costs throughout the supply chain for these small
businesses or the fact that small businesses would not have the resources to
fully trace back the origins of their products. 147 These Senators urged the
SEC to consider adding a de minimis standard to the regulation, exempting
products that contain less than a set amount of conflict minerals from the
regulation, and to create an "indeterminate origin" category within the rule
to allow for a more lenient standard for compliance if small businesses are
unable to determine the origin of the minerals. 148 In its final rule however,
the SEC did not create any exemptions for small businesses nor did it
exempt the de minimis use of conflict minerals.
1 49
Despite the concern expressed by many commentators, in its final
rule, the SEC decided not to exempt smaller reporting companies under the
belief that it would not achieve Congress's objectives with regards to
section 13(p). Thus, the statutory section applies to all issuers with
necessary conflict minerals regardless of size and regardless of placement
in the supply chain. 150 However, the SEC did include an extra two-year
temporary period for small reporting companies to use the "DRC conflict
undeterminable" label, in recognition that smaller companies may face
disproportionally higher burdens than larger companies, and in hopes that a
longer temporary period may alleviate some of those burdens. 51 It is
unclear, however, whether this longer temporary period for small reporting
companies will be beneficial, given that larger reporting companies may
rely on these small companies in their supply chain to determine the origin
of their minerals by the larger companies' shorter deadlines. Larger SEC
reporting companies may end up exerting pressure on these smaller
reporting companies, as well as small private businesses that are not
145 The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America
and the Congo: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Policy & Trade of
the Comm. on Fin. Serv., supra note 133, at 10.
146 See Letter from Snowe, supra note 134.
147 i.
148 Id.
49 See generally 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274.
5
°Id. at 56,361.
151 Id. at 56,281.
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required to report, in order to obtain necessary data to make themselves
compliant. 1
52
The SEC approximates that roughly "6,000 issuers [almost half of
the U.S. companies already subject to SEC regulation] will be directly
impacted by the rule and that many private companies [including small
businesses] in the supply chains of these issuers will be impacted
indirectly." 15 3 These indirectly impacted issuers include small businesses.
Additionally, "[t]he SEC has estimated that 75% percent of registrants
subject to Section 1502 will need to develop a Conflict Minerals Report and
have it audited by an independent third party., 154 While these numbers are
certainly accurate estimates, the actual number of affected businesses could
be far higher.
B. The Effects of Section 1504
1. Costs and Benefits of Compliance
Although the SEC is in the process of rewriting the rule for section
1504 to conform with the district court's decision in American Petroleum
Institute v. SEC, the rulemaking process for the original rule provides an
indication of the SEC's perspective and suggests what the new rule might
look like. Based on the original analysis, the costs of this rule may be high
both monetarily and in terms of decreased U.S. competition in the global oil
market. The SEC recognized that its original final rule for section 1504
would "impose a burden on competition," but believed that "any burden on
competition that may result [is] necessary in furtherance of the purposes of
the Exchange Act, including Section 13(q). 55 The SEC admitted the
benefits of the rule "do not appear to be ones that will necessarily generate
measurable, direct economic benefits to investors or issuers," but rather
relate to accountability, stability and good governance in resource-rich
countries around the world. 156 Additionally, possible benefits might include
help to investors in assessing the risks faced by resource extraction issuers
that operate in these resource-rich countries, as well as the individual
project level risks. 57
By contrast, commentators anticipated the costs to include
modifications to the issuer's resource planning and financial reporting
systems in order to capture the new information that must be reported, as
152 See Conflict Minerals: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 61.
153 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 47, at 1.
154 Id at6.
155 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365,
56,372 n.88 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
116 Id. at 56,398.
151 Id. at 56,408.
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well as the additional time and people required for ongoing compliance.' 58
However, the commentators disputed the extent of the effect of this cost.
The SEC expected that the rule could result in significant economic
effects and that issuers with a reporting requirement "could be put at a
competitive disadvantage with respect to private companies and foreign
companies that are not subject to the reporting requirements."' ' 59
Monetarily, the SEC's own estimation was that the original rule
would cost U.S. issuers about one billion dollars in initial compliance cost
and ongoing compliance costs between $200 million and $400 million
annually. 160 If correct, "[t]hese estimates would make Section 1504 one of
the most costly rules in history and it only applies to one industrial
sector." 61 SEC Commissioner Gallagher noted that "[t]he costs this rule
will impose are clear enough. Its intended benefits, by contrast, are socio-
political and aspirational in nature, worthy but indeterminate - although
they are presumed to justify all costs.' 62 Gallagher additionally expressed,
"even if I had no objection in principle to efforts to achieve social and
foreign policy objectives through the disclosure requirements of the
securities laws, I am not able to support this rule today, because the analysis
is incomplete."'
' 63
2. Scope of Section 1504
While this rule affects only one industrial sector, it affects small
and large entities alike. A company is considered a "resource extraction
issuer," and thus covered by the original rule, if it "is required to file an
annual reports with the Commission; and engages in the commercial
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals."' 64 Commercial development
includes "exploration, extraction, processing, and export, or the acquisition
of a license for any such activity.,"' 65 This involves "companies that drill for
oil, mine for precious metals or minerals or extract natural gas.' 66 While
18 Id. at 56,404.
'59 Id. at 56,402.
160 Id. at 56,411.
161 Brigham A. McCown, Oil and Gas Payment Disclosure May Harm Investors,
FORBES (Mar. 22, 2013, 10:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brighammccown/
2013/03/22/oil-and-gas-payment-disclosure-may-harm-investors/.
162 Gallagher, supra note 31.
163 Id.
164 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers: A Small Entity
Compliance Guide, SEC (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/resource-extraction-small-entity-
compliance-guide.htm.165 Id.
166 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ANOTHER SIDE OF DODD-FRANK:
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 1504 2 (2012).
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companies engaged directly in any aspect of these activities are covered, the
definition is not meant to include "activities that are ancillary or preparatory
to commercial development."']67
Section 1504 requires resource extraction issuers to report any
payments made to governments (foreign or the U.S.) for the purpose of
commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals that are not de
minimis, which the SEC has defined as "any payment or series of payments
aggregating $100,000 or more during an issuer's fiscal year."' 168 Essentially,
"all payments to governments ... must be tracked, regardless of the value
or materiality of any individual payment."'
169
According to the SEC over 1,100 companies will be
covered by the information disclosure requirements under
Section 1504, including a majority of the most profitable
international oil companies (e.g. Chevron, Exxon, BP,
Shell and Total), the largest global mining companies (Rio
Tinto, Vale and BHP Billiton) and certain state-owned
entities (Petrobras, Sinopec and Petrochina).170
However, many state-owned oil companies, some of the largest oil
companies in the world, in countries such as Russia, China, Iran and
Venezuela do not operate in the highly transparent, intensely regulated
world of U.S. issuers.' 71 In fact, the ten largest oil companies in the world
are national oil companies that are not listed on stock exchanges. 72 If the
largest companies in the world are unaffected, it will be difficult to reduce
the "resource curse" phenomenon to any great extent.1 73 According to SEC
Commissioner Gallagher, these foreign companies "will reap competitive
advantage through today's rules.' 74
Furthermore, the final rules for section 1504 do not offer
167 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers: A Small Entity
Compliance Guide, supra note 164.
168 Conflict Minerals: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 61, at 3.
169 id.
170 Q&A: Company Disclosures Under Dodd-Frank Section 1504, REVENUE
WATCH INST. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/qa-company-
disclosures-under-dodd-frank-section-i 504.
171 Gallagher, supra note 31.
172 ALDONAS, supra note 90, at 12.
173 Id. at 13 n.35 (defining "resource curse" as "an increasingly perverse
development pattern rooted in the interaction between oil, gas mineral dependence
and weak states ... inextricably intertwined with the lack of transparency in the
extractive industries") (citation omitted).
174 Gallagher, supra note 31.
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exemptions of any kind. 175 The Commission declined to exercise its
exempted authority to waive the disclosure requirements for four countries
whose laws do not allow this type of disclosure: Angola, Cameroon, China
and Qatar.176 The Commission acknowledged that the commentators'
concerns seemed warranted, but it believed that "adopting such an
exemption would be inconsistent with the structure and language of Section
13(q). 17 Additionally, the original final rule did not provide an exemption
for instances when an issuer has a confidentiality provision in an existing or
future contract or for commercially sensitive information. 
78
Due to the lack of exemptions, the original final rule also affects
small entities that are required to file an annual report with the Commission
under sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that are engaged in
the commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals, regardless of
the size of the company. 179 The SEC did not believe an exemption would be
consistent with the statutory purpose of Section 13(q) because "different
disclosure requirements . . . for small entities . . .would impede the
transparency and comparability of the disclosure."' 180 This lack of
exemptions could be repeated in the final rule, or changed, now that the
SEC knows that it has discretion in determining the scope of disclosure.
3. Other Effects of Section 1504
Because the rule for section 1504 has been vacated, there is
uncertainty for businesses as to the future of the requirement. By vacating
the SEC rule for oil payment disclosure, it is effectively removed from the
Federal Register. 181 As such, "at the present time, there is no requirement to
file a Form SD to report resource extraction payments.' 82 However, issuers
that were impacted by the SEC's resource extraction payments disclosure
rule are advised to continue to monitor developments in the new 1504
rulemaking and related litigation for further developments, as the Dodd-
Frank mandate of payment reporting remains intact.1 83 The uncertainty
presented by the vacated rule creates challenges in preparing for reporting
175 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365,
56,368 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
176 Id. at 56,371.
117 Id. at 56,372.
178 Id. at 56,371.
179 Id. at 56,417; Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers: A Small
Entity Compliance Guide, supra note 164.
180 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,417.
181 RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 2.
182 d.
183 See SAMUEL W. COOPER & S. JoY DOWDLE, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, FEDERAL
COURT VACATES THE SEC's SECTION 1504 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
PAYMENTS TO GOVERNMENTS BY OIL, GAS, AND MINING COMPANIES (2013).
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and companies will face difficulties in preparing for the unknown. It will
likely be some time before businesses will know what the final rule for the
reporting requirement will be; the SEC will need to publish a proposed rule,
allow interested parties to comment and then approve the rule. 1 4 This
process may translate into monetary costs for affected businesses as they
direct time and human resources into compliance preparations. These
ancillary costs of unguided preparations could further harm businesses
beyond the original cost of the rule.
IV. PROPOSAL
Dodd-Frank was emergency legislation to correct problems on Wall
Street and to protect consumers. Provisions 1502 and 1504 do neither of
those things. Moreover, both provisions seek attenuated and intangible
goals at high practical costs. Ironically, these economically unsound
provisions were included in a bill meant to stabilize and protect the
economy. Now that it has been nearly four years since Dodd-Frank, and in
light of the problems that have arisen with these provisions, it is time for
Congress to reexamine these two provisions. Congress needs to reconsider
the relationship between the humanitarian purpose of the provisions and the
goals of Dodd-Frank and whether this legislation is the best way to
accomplish those humanitarian goals. Congress should reexamine the
language of the bill and, if not repeal, amend the two provisions to better
address the economic issues that have been encountered. If Congress is
unable to do this, the SEC should use its rulemaking power to interpret the
provisions in a way that minimizes the strain to small businesses as well as
to investors and the overall market. Finally, if the government does not act
to remedy these concerns, businesses and their representative associations
should challenge the provisions through continuing legal efforts and
lobbying.
A. Congress Should Reconsider and Rewrite the Provisions
Congress did not fully explore the implications of sections 1502 or
1504 before Dodd-Frank was passed. 185 Thus, it would be beneficial for
Congress to take the opportunity to go back and reexamine these provisions
in light of the difficulties exposed by the SEC rulemaking. It is clear that
both sections 1502 and 1504 will have substantial and wide-reaching
184 RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 2.
185 See Letter from Mike Koehler, Assistant Professor of Bus. Law, Butler Univ., to
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Koehler] (on file with the SEC);
see also Letter from David M. Sindelar, CEO, Viasystems, to Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Sindelar] (on file
with the SEC).
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effects. Congress needs to reexamine these provisions to determine if they
will accomplish their humanitarian goals through these types of disclosures
and if the price of these disclosures comes at a cost Congress is willing to
bear. Additionally, Congress needs to examine whether the SEC is the
proper outlet for promoting its humanitarian goals.
In light of the seemingly opposite conclusions in the legal
challenges on sections 1502 and 1504, Congress should weigh in on its
intentions and perhaps amend section 1502 to address the concerns in
interpretation raised by the plaintiffs in National Ass 'n of Manufacturers v.
SEC. The district court in that case determined that the lack of exceptions
was the "product of reasoned decision-making" and that the SEC's
conclusion that exceptions "would jeopardize the effectiveness of the Rule"
was permissible. 116 By contrast, the court in American Petroleum Institute
v. SEC determined the lack of exemptions in the rule for section 1504 was
arbitrary and capricious, and that the SEC was incorrect in resting "on the
blanket proposition that avoiding all exemptions best furthers section
13(q)'s purpose. 187 These differing decisions involving similar provisions
and similar rulemaking reflect unclear congressional intent, and Congress is
in a better position than both the court systems and the SEC to express what
in fact it intended.
Accordingly, because section 1502 was silent as to the availability
of a de minimis exception, Congress should weigh in on whether it now
believes a de minimis exception is appropriate or whether it did and does
intend to rely on the SEC's deference. Congress should also expound upon
the requirements for small businesses, specifically whether it intended that
no exceptions for small businesses were to be given under section 1502 or
whether it believes the purposes of the Act can be achieved with exceptions
for small businesses. Congress should also weigh in on whether the
requirements in Exchange Act sections 3(f) and 23(a)(2) were meant to
apply to section 1502 or whether the lack of reference was purposeful.
These sections are meant to "promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation" and to avoid imposing "a burden on competition not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of' the Exchange Act.188 If
applicable, the SEC rulemaking is surely flawed, particularly in respect to
small businesses, which would be unfairly burdened due to fewer resources
with which to fully trace back the origins of their products.
Additionally, for section 1502, Congress could encourage other
countries to participate in a joint effort rather than unilaterally
implementing a regulatory scheme that injures U.S. businesses to the
186 Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d43, 66-68 (D.D.C. 2013);
STEPTOE, supra note 67.
187 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5,22 (D.D.C. 2013).
188 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78(w)(a)(2) (2012).
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benefit of competitors, such as with the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme (KPCS). 89 The KPCS is an international governmental
certification scheme that was set up to prevent trade in diamonds that fund
conflict.' 90 The KPCS was "endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and
launched in January 2003. '191 It is an import-export certification scheme
that requires participating governments, including the United States, to
verify "the origin of rough diamonds, and put in place effective controls to
prevent conflict stones from entering the supply chain.' 92 Participant
countries pass legislation to implement their part in the scheme
domestically, and then can only trade rough diamonds with other members,
which creates a strong incentive for additional countries to join.1 93 Congress
could better achieve its humanitarian goals, with a diminished competitive
cost to U.S. businesses, through a collaborative effort like the KPCS.
From a broader perspective, Congress should explore whether
section 1502 would even "help end the conflict in the DRC, and what its
effects would be on the Congolese people., 194 On May 9, 2012, the United
States House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on International
Monetary Policy and Trade held a hearing entitled "Costs and
Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America and the
Congo" in which both Republican and Democratic members of Congress
expressed concern that section 1502 may result in a de facto embargo on
minerals mined in the Congo, leaving many legitimate miners without
means to provide for their families.195 Additionally, on May 21, 2013, the
United States House Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy
and Trade held a hearing on "The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-
Frank's Conflict Minerals Provision" to explore concerns that section 1502
would not reduce conflict in the DRC.196 It is clear that at least some
Congress members are aware of the concerns; it is also clear that Congress
needs to discuss in depth whether the uncertain outcome of section 1502
justifies the high costs.
189 See Woody, supra note 33, at 1347-48.
190 The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS,
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-
F rocess (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
Id.192 id.
193 Id.
194 See Sindelar, supra note 183.
195 id.
196 See The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank's Conflict Minerals
Provision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Pol 'y & Trade of the H,
Comm. on Fin. Servs., I I3th Cong. 1 (2013).
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Similarly, Congress should reexamine section 1504 with respect to
small businesses. Luckily, due to the decision in American Petroleum
Institute v. SEC, the SEC may be able to interpret section 1504 in a way
that is less burdensome for businesses overall. However, as discussed
below, the court decision may allow for a much more narrow interpretation,
which may require congressional intervention to correct. Congress should
make clear its intentions on exceptions, or lack thereof, for conflict of laws
for countries such as Angola, Cameroon, China and Qatar and explain
whether it believes avoiding all exemptions best furthers section 13(q)'s
purpose. Congress should also clearly define "to the extent practicable" and
address whether the resource extraction payments reports must be made
public. In determining these issues Congress should have purposeful debate
with input from relevant parties. Additionally, Congress should explore
measures more in line with the existing EITI polices, which have already
been proven successful. Congress can accomplish these fixes though
committee discussion and, if possible, an amendment to the original
provisions in Dodd-Frank.
Moreover, Congress needs to examine whether the SEC is the best
agency for accomplishing the provisions' goals. These provisions represent
an "unprecedented use of U.S. securities regulation as an instrument of
human rights policy."' 97 The SEC itself has made it clear that these
provisions provide few, if any, benefits to investors and that it is not a
priority for the agency.198 Congress should reallocate responsibility for the
rulemaking and enforcement of these provisions to an agency more familiar
with world issues and better-suited for addressing humanitarian and
diplomatic goals, such as the Department of State or the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department, which already handles
existing sanctions programs.199
As a larger lesson, Congress should exercise greater restraint in
including riders in bills, especially in legislation that is hurried through
Congress. These provisions were inserted into Dodd-Frank at the last
minute and thus were not subjected to any meaningful debate or analysis
prior to enactment. °0 In situations in which this has occurred, Congress
should make it a routine practice to review riders after enactment to make
sure the unrelated provisions are not impracticable or irresponsible.
197 Memorandum from FSC Majority Comm. Staff to Members of the Comm. on
Fin. Serv. 3 (May 16, 2013) (on file with the House of Representatives Committee
on Financial Services).
198 See Gallagher, supra note 31.199 Woody, supra note 33, at 1351.
200 Koehler, supra note 185.
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B. The SEC Should Reinterpret the Language
While it is not likely that the SEC will have a chance to fully
reinterpret section 1502 after the decision in National Ass'n of
Manufacturers v. SEC, due to the narrow issue on which it was overturned,
further appeals may allow the SEC to revise it with a greater eye to their
discretion with regard to small businesses. However, due to the district
court's decision in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, the SEC is in a
position with section 1504 to reinterpret Congress's mandate with greater
discretion.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) recommends the new rule
include a "compilation model" in which the data required to be disclosed is
compiled rather than disclosed individually.20' This model "mitigates the
risk that company payment data could be used by competitors to the
detriment of SEC-registered resource extraction issuers and their
shareholders. 20 2 Additionally, the API advocates for a conflict of laws
exemption, consistent with the district court's ruling, in order to prevent the
burden on competition posed by this disclosure in countries in which
disclosure would violate local laws.20 3 By using its authority to interpret
section 1504 this way, the SEC better protects investors by protecting the
ability of these corporations to do business.
Even if this is not possible, the SEC should at the very least find an
interpretation of the language that allows for small entity exemptions.
While there are high costs with uncertain benefits placed upon all
businesses, small businesses in particular face difficulty in complying with
these provisions, putting them at a disadvantage that goes against the small
entity language in SEC rulemaking. The SEC should use its authority under
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which allows agencies like the SEC to
consider significant alternatives that would accomplish their stated
objectives, while minimizing any significant adverse impact on small
204
entities.
Supporters of section 1504 and the original SEC final rule,
however, call for revisions that require disclosure of project-level payments
without country-level exemptions, and believe these disclosures should be
201 Letter from Patrick T. Mulva, Chairman, Am. Petroleum Inst. Gen. Fin. Comm.,
& Stephen Comstock, Dir. of Tax & Accounting Policy, API to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Nov. 7, 2013) (on file with the SEC).
202 id.
203 Id. at 7-9.
204 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
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made available to the public. 205 These supporters believe that the district
court's decision in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC allows for these
findings because the narrow holding found only that Congress intended for
the Commission to use its broad discretion to reasonably interpret what was
an ambiguous statutory mandate, rather than the strict mandate that the
Commission believed it had been given.206 It is important that the SEC not
heed these views because they ignore the underlying issues with the
legislation, and rely on a misleading interpretation of the district court's
decision.
Moreover, while the SEC rewrites the new final rule it should take
this opportunity to explore again Congress's purpose in the Dodd-Frank Act
as a whole, particularly ending "too big to fail," protecting the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts and protecting consumers from abusive
financial services practices. It would seem counterintuitive that in this Act
Congress could intend to include small businesses in sections 1502 and
1504 without exceptions, thereby causing them financial hardship and
damaging the economy that Dodd-Frank was intended to fix.
C. Businesses Should Continue to Challenge
Businesses and their respective associations should keep
challenging these provisions both in court and through lobbying. It is
through the efforts of organizations such as the American Petroleum
Institute, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Independent Petroleum
Association of America and the National Foreign Trade Counsel that
section 1504 was overturned in favor of better interpretation and analysis. 0 7
Businesses, especially small businesses, need representatives to continue
lobbying efforts as the SEC rewrites the rule for section 1504. Simply
because the SEC came to the conclusion that it did not have discretion,
when in fact the legislature intended to give it deference, does not
necessarily mean that the SEC's new rule will fully address the concerns
expressed by the plaintiffs in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC. With
opposing interests committed to an SEC rule that is largely the same as the
original, but arrived at through SEC discretion, it is important that a rational
cost-benefit analysis prevail.
Because the district and appeals courts upheld many of the more
controversial aspects of the SEC rule for section 1502, another appeal
205 See, e.g., Letter from Corinna Gilfillan, Head of the U.S. Office, Global
Witness, & Simon Taylor, Dir., Global Witness to Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n 1 (Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with the SEC).
206 See, e.g., Letter from Raymond C. Offenheiser et al., President, Oxfam Am., to
Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with the
SEC).207 See generally Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
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would be required to challenge the rule further legally. This requires
additional effort from businesses and their associations if they wish to
change the SEC's final rule. Alternatively, businesses can lobby Congress
to reexamine section 1502, as well as section 1504, in an effort to change or
repeal the provision. Finally, because Congress is unlikely to overturn
enacted legislation in the current political climate (or even discuss the
legislation),2 °8 and in case the SEC chooses a disadvantageous
interpretation for the new rule, it is up to the businesses and organizations
that are burdened by these provisions to stand up for rational cost benefit
analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Although well intentioned, Dodd-Frank's specialized disclosure
provisions 1502 and 1504 do more harm than good overall. Dodd-Frank's
lofty goal of financial stability is lost in the socially motivated nature of
these sections. Even if sections 1502 and 1504 manage to achieve their
purported goals, these benefits are intangible and outweighed by the severe
monetary costs and competitive disadvantage to small and large businesses
alike. Moreover, this use of the SEC has proven to be a bane to the
Commission and set an unfortunate precedent for future legislation. This
Note discussed these topics in depth, as well as providing a brief
explanation of the financial crisis, Dodd-Frank, the rules for sections 1502
and 1504 and the recent court challenges to those sections. Additionally,
this Note explored the costs and benefits of each section. Finally, the Note
proposed solutions that could be effectuated by Congress, the SEC or
businesses themselves. Hopefully, with diligence by any or all of these
parties, there is still time to reform Dodd-Frank in order to protect
American businesses and the still recovering economy.
208 See Jonathon Weisman, Congress Sets Sights Low After 2013 Legislative
Record, GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2014),
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